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Asymmetries and Shortages 
of the Network 
Neutrality Principie 
What could neutrality achieve? 
T HE DEBATE ON network neu-trality has reached sufficient notoriety to elimínate the need for detailed explana-tion. A simple definition 
will suffice: "network neutrality" is un-
derstood as the principie by which the 
owners of broadband networks would 
not be allowed to establish any type of 
discrimination or preference over the 
traffic transmitted through them. 
What is indeed interesting to re-
member is the origin of the debate. 
In February 2002, the U.S. the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), 
launched a proposal considering DSL 
connections as an "information ser-
vice" and, thus, not subject to access 
requirements telephone companies 
must fulfill. The following month, the 
FCC launched a similar draft for cable 
networks and requested comments on 
what the regulatory regime that would 
finally prevail should look like. The 
comments received by the FCC, par-
ticularly those of the High Tech Broad-
band Coalition (HTBC) Group, which 
integrates different associations and 
partnerships of the ICT industry, rep-
resent the starting point of the subse-
quent controversy.9 
We recall the beginning of the con-
troversy because, since then and per-
haps as an inheritance of this begin-
ning, it has been restricted to fixed 
broadband networks. Indeed, academ-
ic papers, political opinions and media 
comments have appeared in favor of 
or against network neutrality but have 
always shared one issue: the opinions 
provided continué to limit the fight 
to the scope of traditional networks 
(telephone or cable). Take as the most 
prominent example the two articles 
recently published by Communica-
tions on the topic. Van Schewick and 
Farber's Point/Counterpoint explicitly 
played on the landline carriers' court.6 
In his less prescriptive, more descrip-
tive (regulatory) Viewpoint, Larouche 
uses a broader term (ISPs) but takes a 
similar approach.3 
It is not our intention to provide 
new arguments underl ining the vir-
tues of the support ing or opposing 
positions. The matter we would like 
to stress is the narrow-mindedness 
of the approach that is adopted re-
peatedly. It mus t be remembered that 
the defenders of network neutrality 
base their arguments on the need to 
avoid closing the door to any innova-
tion: the Internet would simply be a 
platform necessary for the competi-
tion between application developers 
(see, for example, Weinstein7). With 
this idea in mind, there are three axes 
toward which the debate could, or 
should, extend. 
First, it is interesting to recall the 
opinión of Zittrain, for whom "Inter-
net is better conceptualized as a gen-
erative grid that includes both PCs and 
networks rather than as an open net-
work indifferent to the configuration 
of its endpoints."10 This way, what oc-
curs in the pipes would be only a part 
of the problem and what he defines 
as "PC openness" could be set out. In 
fact, this is the path where the more 
theoretical journey has taken place, 
thanks basically to the work of open 
source software supporters. However, 
it is surprising that connections with 
network neutrality have not been ex-
plored in greater depth. And this is 
not just about PCs. As other electronic 
devices (consider mobile handhelds, 
and more specifically, smartphones) 
win the favor of consumers, so does 
their role as intermediary (always neu-
tral?) between applications or content 
creators and possible clients. 
Second, quite outstanding is the 
fact that, until the FCC's Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, released Oct. 
22, 2009, and with a few significant 
exceptions (such as Frieden1, Wu8), no 
one had considered wireless connec-
tions in their analyses. It can be said 
that, although not specifically stated, 
a certain degree of consensus for 
"naturally" extending the current ar-
guments to Wi-Fi or WiMax networks 
has probably existed. But what about 
mobile operators? If there is a service 
where network neutrality has been 
really breached, it is the data access 
service provided by mobile operators. 
The extreme discrimination model 
("walled garden") is still used by op-
erators throughout the world. Walled 
gardens have been accepted as anoth-
er of the possible business strategies 
of companies operating in the sector, 
and almost no one has torn their hair 
out. Without going to the extreme rep-
resented by walled gardens, are there 
any circumstances, as the FCC asks, 
in which it could be reasonable for a 
wireless network to block video, VoIP, 
or peer-to-peer applications? 
Last, the focus must be targeted 
toward some of the applications that 
have become the de facto door for ac-
cessing the Internet and that can be 
considered as instrumental as the 
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in a convergent 
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coexistence of 
different regulatory 
criteria does 
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network itself. It must be considered 
that for every business project where 
it is vital that the network owner does 
not discriminate the traffic generated 
by the application, there are probably 
another 100 whose concern is limited 
to the order in which they appear in a 
specific portal or search engine. And 
here one can find a clear asymmetry be-
tween what is supported "downward" 
and what actually happens "upstairs." 
Naturally, search engines, portáis, and 
aggregators of diverse content or di-
rectories quicklyjoined the defenders 
of network neutrality.. .a fact that does 
not prevent them from prioritizing 
certain customers: those with which 
they have a "special relationship" or, 
simply, those that pay. That is exactly 
the opposite of what these same com-
panies demand from network opera-
tors. Let us clarify that discrimination 
is not always arbitrary or unfair. In 
particular, search engines must follow 
some regulatory guidelines2 but still 
discrimination is possible. Along the 
same line, Pasquale5 or Odlyzko4 have 
already discussed the parallelism be-
tween the basic principies of transpar-
ency that should similarly inform car-
riage and search regulation. 
Note that the use of the condition in 
the title of this column means the au-
thors do not cali for the imposition of 
a "universal" neutrality affecting net-
works, equipment, software, and ap-
plications (could we cali it gatekeeper 
neutrality?). Without engaging in such 
a discussion, what we do assert is that 
the analysis, in its current dimensión, 
does not go far enough. 
Neutrality has other facets, certain-
ly. Another neutrality, often presented 
as a cornerstone for correct regula-
tion—technological neutrality—al-
ready demands an initial reconsidera-
tion of the reasoning. But even beyond 
that, in a convergent industry where 
agents from "different worlds" often 
fight to conquer the same links in the 
valué chain (integrating as many ac-
tivities as possible for a tighter control 
of the valué network), the rules of the 
game should be equal for everyone. 
While most of these agents are judged 
ex post, and their activity is limited 
only when it harms competition or 
hampers the development of the mar-
kets, others have to comply with strin-
gent ex ante regulations. This does 
not necessarily imply that the anti-
trust-oriented approach should be ex-
tended to any party. On the contrary, 
a general forward-looking regulatory 
model that would guarantee certain 
rights and abilities (such as privacy 
and interoperability) would probably 
beneeded. 
In any case, what is clear is that in 
a convergent scenario the coexistence 
of different regulatory criteria does not 
seem fair. And one must not forget that 
convergence, the same convergence 
that never seems to arrive, cannot be 
slowed down. H 
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